recognition, however, is that compatibilists also face a serious problem of present luck.
The problem of present luck, I shall argue, is an obstacle confronting all accounts of free will. I do not suggest that the compatibilist problem of present luck is just as significant as the problem that confronts libertarianism; taken by itself there are reasons to think that it is less significant. However, the problem of present luck is significant enough to undermine solutions to the problem of remote -constitutive -luck which are offered by history-sensitive compatibilists. Not all compatibilists are history-sensitive; some deny that free will or moral responsibility are historical concepts. These kinds of compatibilists will be able to live with the problem of present luck, but history-sensitive compatibilists cannot. The success of this argument would constitute a powerful reason to abandon a historical account of moral responsibility in favour of a non-historical one, of which there are several on the market today.
I. LUCK IN A COMPATIBILIST WORLD
Luck is the obverse of control, and control is at the heart of the free will debate. Though there are ways of losing control which are not due to luck, whatever is due to luck is outside our control. Luck therefore seems to be at odds with free will. It is this intuition to which implicit appeal is made in the debate over libertarian accounts of freedom, and over their apparent reliance upon events that are a matter of luck. But present luck is a feature of deterministic worlds as well as indeterministic.
The kind of present luck which haunts indeterministic worlds is luck sub specie aeternitatis, luck from the point of view of the universe. Luck sub specie aeternitatis is metaphysical-level luck in the unfolding of events, luck which is in principle beyond a finite agent's ability to control or even to predict. Van Inwagen, for instance, 3 in the course of endorsing the luck argument, makes vivid the lack of control a libertarian agent has over genuinely undetermined events by considering what would happen if God rolled back the relevant stretch of history to some point prior to an undetermined event and then allowed it to unfold once more. Whether events unfold in the same way on the replay as they did the first time round is genuinely undetermined, and nothing the agent does (or is) can ensure which undetermined possibility is realized. This kind of luck is luck sub specie aeternitatis because the unpredictability of how things turn out is not due to any epistemic limitation of ours, any limit in our knowledge or in our computational speed or capacity. Instead, how things go is unpredictable and uncontrollable in principle: although agents may be able to influence the relative probabilities of the events, so long as these are genuinely undetermined, agents cannot ensure that one event occurs rather than another.
Luck sub specie aeternitatis may be genuinely a feature of our world, if certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are correct. But in everyday life, this is not the kind of luck with which we are concerned. When we say that an agent experienced good or bad luck, we do not mean that quantum level fluctuations influenced the agent's life for good or ill. Instead we have in mind some notion of luck that is metaphysically much less demanding.
Luck is a function of three factors: significance, chance and control. We do not speak of entirely trivial events as lucky (i.e., a matter of luck, good or bad, for an agent); even genuinely undetermined events are not lucky when they are trivial. Adding lack of control to significance does not suffice to make an event lucky, as the example of death illustrates. None of us can exercise control over the fact that we die; hence we do not say that a person is unlucky to die (as opposed, say, to dying an untimely death). Death is not lucky for us, because it is not chancy.
Despite appearances, chanciness does not require indeterminism (though all undetermined events are chancy). Whether an agent wins a fair lottery is a matter of chance (and luck), though the lottery may take place in a deterministic world. The notion of chanciness can be explicated in terms of the nearness to us in modal space of worlds in which the event goes a different way from the way it goes in the actual world. An event's obtaining is chancy for an agent if in a significant proportion of relevant possible worlds the event does not obtain, where the relevant possible worlds are those obtainable by making no more than a small change in the actual world at a time just prior to the event's occurrence. 4 What proportion is significant enough? Coffman suggests at least half. However, it is plausible to think that the proportion is sensitive to the significance of the event for the agent. George, who is missed by a sniper's bullet, counts as lucky, even though the sniper is inept and misses in % of nearby possible worlds.
Chanciness, understood in this manner, is an objective matter. But luck is an importantly epistemic notion, closely related to the predictability to us of an event. The reason why luck is importantly epistemic is that control is importantly epistemic. For an agent A to be able to control an event's (non-) occurrence, A needs relevant knowledge. Agents often fail to know how they can bring about an event's occurrence; sometimes they know how to bring about an event's occurrence, but that event is lucky for them because they lack knowledge of the event's significance. We might, for instance, say that A was lucky not to be on an aircraft that crashed, even though A acted to ensure that he was not on that aircraft (say, by taking a later flight). If A might easily have been on that aircraft -possible worlds in which A took that flight are nearby in modal space -A was lucky. Because A chose to take the flight he did in ignorance of the features which made it significant for him, he did not exercise relevant control over the event.
Any event that is a matter of present luck for A can be analysed in the manner suggested; events presently lucky for A are significant for A, chancy, and beyond A's control. However, present luck is not the only kind of luck there is. In addition, there is remote luck, especially in the guise of constitutive luck. 5 Constitutive luck is luck in the traits and dispositions which make one the kind of person one is. Constitutively lucky events and states of affairs are significant for agents and beyond the control of those agents. But some kinds of events that are constitutively lucky for an agent are not chancy. Since some kinds of constitutively lucky events fix the reference of terms referring to agents, possible worlds in which agents do not experience these events are worlds from which the agents are absent altogether. For instance, some philosophers defend a genetic essentialism about identity, according to which one's genes are not subject to chance. Yet there is a clear sense in which one is desperately unlucky to be born with a serious, genetically based, disability. A different but closely related account of luck is needed to capture kinds of constitutively lucky events that fix the reference of agentreferring terms: an event or state of affairs is constitutively lucky for A when it is significant for A, he does not exercise control over its occurrence, and it is the kind of event or state of affairs that is subject to variation in human life (or the lives of the kind of being in question). Just as the proportion of nearby possible worlds in which an event goes a different way from the way it goes in the actual world must be high enough for that event to count as lucky, so the degree of variation in human life must be high enough for reference-fixing events to count as constitutively lucky.
II. HISTORICAL CONDITIONS ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
The apparent need for a deeply historical condition in an account of moral responsibility arises from the following intuition: two agents might be identical, in their snapshot (that is, current time-slice) properties, and yet one might be responsible for his choices while the other is not, because of the manner in which they came to be the kinds of people they are, in the circumstances in which they find themselves. 6 This intuition is often assisted by consideration of manipulation cases. Suppose two agents, Hans and Helmut, each make a sizable donation to Oxfam. Hans is a normal agent, with a normal history; his action reflects his generous nature. Helmut was until yesterday a deeply egoistic man, highly unlikely to make such a donation. As he slept last night, very sophisticated brainwashers rewired his neural networks to transform him into as close a psychological duplicate of Hans as is compatible with continuity of personal identity. When he awoke, Helmut was surprised to find that satisfying the needs of others had a higher priority for him than satisfying his wants. Further exploration revealed that he endorsed this priority, which was entirely congruent with his (new) values and beliefs. This afternoon he accordingly made the donation to Oxfam. Although most people are inclined to praise Hans for his generous act, many are not inclined to praise Helmut. Something about the fact that the springs of Helmut's actions are not due to him -that is, not the product of a causal history in which he was active -makes people reluctant to hold him responsible for the action. 7 There are various ways to resist this conclusion. With Frankfurt, we may insist that what matters is whether agents identify with the springs of their actions, and not how the relevant mental states came about. 8 Or with Scanlon, we may insist that what matters is the quality of agents' wills, however they came to have such wills. 9 Nevertheless, the very fact that these theories deny the historical intuition has been seen by many philosophers as a cost to them; denying the relevance of history is swallowing not so much a bullet as a mortar shell, as McKenna puts it. 10 Intuitively, at least, two agents who are relevantly similar in their snapshot properties may differ in their degree of moral responsibility, or even in whether they are morally responsible, as a consequence of their causal histories. Since sophisticated manipulators can target not only their victim's desires and values, but also whether they identify with these desires, the overall quality of their wills, or any other non-historical condition you care to adduce, to accept that responsibility is not deeply historical, one seems to have to pay the price of accepting that agents can be manipulated not only into performing particular actions, but also into being responsible for these very actions.
III. HISTORY AND LUCK
The problem of history is not a problem in addition to the problems of luck; the problem of history is a problem of luck. Manipulated agents are the victims of (very bad) luck: the manipulation is significant for them, they lack control over its (non-)occurrence, and it is chancy, in as much as there are nearby possible worlds in which the manipulation does not occur. Manipulated agents are victims of a very unusual kind of bad constitutive luck. Their bad constitutive luck is unusual in two respects -the obvious respect (very few people are actually the victims of this kind of manipulation), but also in as much as this kind of constitutive luck is genuinely chancy. It is genuinely chancy because unlike ordinary constitutive luck, there are nearby possible worlds in which the very same agent is not the victim of this kind of luck. However, these differences should not obscure the ways in which the problem of manipulation is just the problem of constitutive luck, luck in the agent's traits and dispositions. We can therefore treat typical cases of bad constitutive luck and philosophical thought-experiments involving manipulation as instances of a single phenomenon, and demand a unified response to both.
History-sensitive compatibilists can usefully be understood as offering a single response to both kinds of constitutive luck. On their views, agents are not responsible as soon as they acquire a set of active dispositions and values; instead, they become responsible by taking responsibility for their dispositions and values. Manipulated agents are not immediately responsible for their actions, because it is only after they have had sufficient time to reflect upon and experience the effects of their new dispositions that they qualify as fully responsible agents. The passing of time (under normal conditions) offers opportunities for deliberation and reflection, thereby enabling agents to become responsible for who they are. Agents become responsible for their dispositions and values in the course of normal life, even when these dispositions and values are the product of awful constitutive luck. At some point bad constitutive luck ceases to excuse, because agents have had time to take responsibility for it.
I shall call the set of traits and dispositions which are the product of constitutive luck an agent's endowment. Different deeply historical accounts of moral responsibility deal with the problem of bad constitutive luck in different ways, but all these responses could be seen as placing ownership conditions on the agent's endowment. 11 Ownership might be seen as an ultimacy condition for compatibilists. Just as source incompatibilists insist on an ultimacy condition, in order to bring it about that agents are not merely creatures of the conditions into which they were born plus their genetic dispositions, so compatibilist ownership conditions are incorporated into historical accounts of moral responsibility to bring it about that agents are not merely creatures of their endowment. On historical accounts of moral responsibility, agents become responsible by making something out of their endowment. Morally responsible agents do not simply inherit dispositions and values; instead, they work upon them, modifying some, rejecting some and taking responsibility for others.
Chuck is an evil agent introduced by Mele. 12 When he was younger, he had traits that disposed him to cruelty. He was born so disposed; this was Chuck's bad constitutive luck. But he was not born irredeemably bad. Though he enjoyed torturing animals when he was a child, he was not wholehearted in his enjoyment. Sometimes he felt guilty enough to consider abandoning animal torture. But he also valued doing as he pleased, and considered morality to be nothing more than a system of conventions designed by the weak to constrain the strong. He therefore set out to make himself more wholehearted in his dispositions, hardening himself to the sight of suffering. He eventually succeeded. Now he is a wholeheartedly evil person. But it is not just bad (constitutive) luck that he is evil. Chuck is partly responsible for the way he is.
Chuck is an extreme case. But, so history-sensitive compatibilists believe, all responsible agents are partially responsible for the way they are. We may not have ever deliberately and explicitly set ourselves the task of changing our characters, but all of us daily engage in activities through which we take responsibility for the persons we are. Hence we become responsible agents. Even thoroughly manipulated agents can take responsibility for themselves, and thereby become responsible. Hence the problem of constitutive luck can be seen off. However, the fact that attempts to make good an ultimacy condition for source incompatibilism are widely seen as falling to the problem of luck, but that luck is as much a feature of deterministic universes as indeterministic, should give advocates of the ownership condition pause. History-sensitive compatibilism's solution to the problem of constitutive luck succeeds only if compatibilism is not subject to a significant problem of present luck, the problem which besets the libertarian solution to the problem of ultimacy. Roughly, libertarian accounts of how agents become ultimately responsible fall foul of the fact that the very events (of intention-formation or of decision-making) which are supposed to bring it about that agents are ultimately responsible for their wills are themselves significantly the product of luck. The libertarian response to the problem of remote, constitutive, luck thereby falls foul of the problem of present luck. Similarly, the compatibilist solution to the problem of constitutive luck can succeed only if the series of actions through which agents shape and modify their endowment are not significantly subject to present luck: we cannot undo the effects of luck with more luck.
IV. COMPATIBILISM AND PRESENT LUCK
Compatibilists who have aimed one or another luck objection at libertarian accounts of moral responsibility have not considered the possibility that their own accounts are subject to an analogous objection. This disregard for luck probably stems from a sense of security fostered by a salient difference between libertarian and compatibilist accounts of free action. Since libertarianism requires genuine indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to free action, libertarians are unable to offer a fully satisfactory contrastive explanation for every event in the chain. 13 For some significant event -the formation of an intention, the coming to mind of a consideration, or whatever it may be -nothing about the agent will explain why that event occurred rather than another which was also causally possible.
Compatibilists have no such problem: for every decision, or event of intention-formation, the compatibilist can offer a contrastive explanation which fully explains why this decision or event occurred rather than another. However, the availability of this contrastive explanation does not rescue the compatibilist from the problem of luck. In fact, contrastive explanations are always available in compatibilist accounts of free agency in virtue of facts which entail that the decision is a product either of constitutive luck, or of present luck, or (very frequently) both.
I have already claimed that compatibilism confronts a problem of constitutive luck. How does the problem of present luck arise for it? Present luck is luck at or near the time of (putatively) directly free action, which significantly influences that action. Prima facie, there are many ways in which agents are subject to present luck. Agents' decisions are significantly influenced by all kinds of chance factors over which they do not exercise control. Which considerations come to mind is, apparently, a matter of luck for an agent (we cannot control which considerations come to mind, because we do not satisfy the epistemic conditions on control over these considerations; to satisfy these conditions, with regard to any particular consideration, that consideration would need already to have come to mind). Of course, for any consideration there are ways to ensure that this consideration is very likely to come to mind at the appropriate time. We can use a variety of techniques to remind ourselves, such as asking others to prompt us. But there is an obvious regress problem here: the same inability to ensure that a relevant consideration arises during deliberation affects every past instant at which we might have taken steps to ensure that the consideration arose when relevant. Our mood may influence what occurs to us, and what weight we give to the considerations that do cross our mind (indeed, the force with which considerations strike us can itself vary from time to time, by chance). Our attention may wander at just the wrong moment or just the right one, or our deliberation may be primed by chance features of our environment. All of these factors are chancy, in the sense defined above, and we lack control over them. Do they not thereby make our decisions subject to present luck, regardless of the causal structure of the universe?
In recent work, Mele has advanced considerations which might be seen as constituting an argument for the claim that the chancy factors which influence (putatively) directly free actions do not amount to present luck. He does not deny that these influences are chancy, nor that they are outside the agent's control. But he does deny that they are very significant; since a significance-condition must be satisfied for a chancy event to count as lucky, if Mele is right, then compatibilism is not subject to present luck at all.
Mele advances his argument in the context of defending his own modest libertarianism, which builds indeterminacy into deliberation, in such a way that it is genuinely undetermined which considerations come to the mind of the deliberating agent. According to this variety of libertarianism, which considerations come to mind is a matter of chance sub specie aeternitatis, but, as Mele points out, it is far from obvious that it is more a matter of chance which considerations come to mind for an agent as described by his libertarianism than on the compatibilist picture. On neither account does the agent control which considerations come, by chance, to mind. But, Mele argues, which considerations come to the mind of the agent, on either account, is not (very) significant for that agent because these considerations are only inputs into deliberation. They have, 'at most, an indirect effect on what the agent decides, an effect that is mediated by the agent's assessment of them' (Free Will and Luck, p. ). Despite their lack of control over the inputs, agents control how they respond to these. Which considerations come to mind is a matter of chance, but not luck.
However, though the considerations that come to mind are merely inputs into deliberation, inputs are frequently decisive. Suppose George is deliberating between two job offers; though he is more strongly attracted to the first than to the second, he worries that his potential colleagues are too snobbish. Were it occur to George that what he has interpreted as snobbish condescension might be nothing more than shyness, he would opt for the first job offer, but if this consideration did not cross his mind he would choose the second. Whether this consideration comes to mind during deliberation is decisive for George, despite the fact that the consideration is 'merely' an input into his deliberation: mere inputs can decisively tip the scales. What goes for George and his decision is often true for everyone: it is frequently true that whether a consideration comes to mind is decisive. Moreover, just as which considerations come to mind may be decisive, so may the other kinds of present chance be decisive. What people recall and when, their moods, fancies, the priming effects of environmental influences -all of these may, when they deliberate between options, tip the scales for them. Even after deliberation people remain vulnerable to decisive present chance. Sometimes people just cannot see which is the better option; sometimes they see (or think they see) that there is no better option. But as agents, they must decide. How do they do so? Well, just by 'plumping', in a manner subject to chance, for one option or another. But if present chance can be decisive, it is significant enough to qualify as present luck.
To be sure, it will usually be the case that present chance is not present luck. Mele is surely right in thinking that very often which considerations come to mind (say) will be mere inputs into decision-making, inputs which do not tip the balance one way or another. In so far as people are rational agents a non-random selection of considerations is likely to cross their minds, with the selection constrained by their values and beliefs. Minds are constituted so that relevant considerations are highly likely to occur to them. Moreover, when agents are unlucky in one way (in so far as, say, they fail to consider something important), this bad luck will probably not matter, in so far as there is a reasonable probability that some failsafe mechanism will ensure that the relevant consideration is taken into account. But the fact, if it is a fact, that present luck is, according to compatibilism, restricted to a relatively small sphere for agents is no help whatsoever in helping them escape the responsibility-undermining effects of luck. For the factors that limit the significance of present luck, downgrading it to present chance, are themselves the product of luck.
For every decision an agent makes, a contrastive explanation will be available. But the availability of contrastive explanations does not entail the exercise of freedom-level control. Contrastive explanations are available in virtue of facts about the agents which are themselves the product of luck. Luck figures in three ways in such explanations. First, contrastive explanations may be available in virtue of A's constitutive luck, when A decides in one way rather than another because his endowment settles the question for him, making that choice uniquely rational for him. Secondly, when contrastive explanations are not available in virtue of constitutive luck, they may be available in virtue of present luck, when A decides in one way rather than another because of the influence of chancy factors (which considerations come to mind, what he notices, and so on) which are beyond A's control. Thirdly and finally, contrastive explanations may be available in virtue of how A is, psychologically, at the time of the decision, where how he is is a product of his endowment as modified by the combined effects of constitutive and present luck. These three options are exhaustive, and the history-sensitive compatibilist can take no comfort from any of them.
What matters, for my purposes, is not the mere fact that the appeal to contrastive explanations fails to rescue compatibilism. What matters is the reason why the appeal fails: compatibilist agents' decisions are explained by constitutive luck or by present luck, or both. The very actions to which history-sensitive compatibilists point, the actions whereby agents take responsibility for their endowment, either express that endowment (when they are explained by constitutive luck) or reflect the agent's present luck, or both. The significance of present luck is limited by constitutive luck, but attempts to satisfy the ownership conditions on constitutive luck are subject to present luck.
V. THE LUCK PINCER
I have argued that contrary to what is usually thought, present luck is a problem for compatibilism. However, in so far as compatibilism does not require the occurrence of undetermined events in the causal chain leading to free action, there is reason to think that its sphere is smaller for the compatibilist than for the libertarian, and its importance correspondingly less. There is no requirement, for the compatibilist, for present luck to play a role in any free decision. The problem of present luck may be significant for compatibilists when it arises, but it might arise relatively infrequently.
There are therefore good reasons to believe that taken on its own the problem of present luck is less serious for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, when the target is history-sensitive compatibilism we ought not to take the problem on its own. We need to assess the implications of present luck in conjunction with the implications of constitutive luck. I have already pointed out the reason: though it might often, perhaps usually, be the case that the role played by present luck in the decisions and actions of compatibilist agents is relatively small, it is the agent's endowment -directly, or as modified by the effects of present luck -which explains why this is so. Decisions are easy for an agent when dispositions and values render them easy, that is, when the pre-existing background of reasons (desires, attitudes, beliefs and values) against which an agent deliberates decisively supports one course of action over alternatives. But this background is the endowment from constitutive luck, inflected and modified, to be sure, but inflected and modified by decisions which either express constitutive luck, or which were not settled by the endowment, and therefore were subject to present luck. Hence the luck pincer: actions are (directly or indirectly) either the product of constitutive luck or of present luck, or both.
Compatibilists appeal to the ability to take responsibility for constitutive luck, pointing out that their endowment does not determine how agents choose. Like Mele's Chuck, the idea is, we are each able to work on ourselves, modifying inherited elements or endorsing them. In so far, however, as we possess the power to make decisions that modify our endowment, this is a power that is subject to luck. When we modify our values, reasons and desires, we act against reasons of our own. People certainly sometimes do this, but they do so in one of two ways: either they do so in a way that is determined by their endowment -and therefore expresses, rather than overcoming, constitutive luck -or they do so in a manner subject to present luck.
To take the first disjunct, sometimes agents act against their own reasons in ways which are determined by their endowment, that is, the set of reasons they have as a result of constitutive luck. They do this when their reasons are inconsistent or incoherent, but when the inconsistency is relatively minor: the reasons strongly support acting in one way, though they also have reasons which weakly support an alternative. On this disjunct, acting against one's reasons comes to no more than ironing out inconsistencies in them. To that extent, this disjunct expresses the background against which people deliberate. They do not escape their constitutive luck, on this disjunct.
On the second disjunct, how people choose is not settled by the background. Their reasons do not decisively support one decision over another. But precisely because it is not settled by their reasons, the decision is subject to present luck: whether or not a consideration occurs to one, the force with which it does if it does, or the way in which one 'plumps' -these and other instances of present luck are decisive, settling how people decide and act, and they are decisive because their reasons do not settle the issue. Either the background settles it, or present luck plays a decisive role.
Mele's Chuck is somewhat underdescribed; on one way of fleshing him out he is subject to the first disjunct, and on another to the second. Suppose, first, that Chuck's occasional guilt and squeamishness played a minor part in his cognitive economy, whereas his sense of superiority to others and his conviction that morality is an illusion was central to his web of beliefs. In that case, he could not rationally have chosen to remake himself into a morally good agent. Had he chosen in that way, this could only be as the consequence of some glitch in his agency, that is, as the result of some very unusual kind of present luck. In the absence of such a glitch, if Chuck was strongly identified with what one might call the Nietzschean aspects of himself, then in rejecting his sympathy and his guilt he was expressing the endowment of his constitutive luck. He was altering himself, to be sure, but in ways determined by his constitutive luck. If that is right, his actions do not enable him to escape constitutive luck or even to soften its effects.
On the other hand, Chuck's endowment from constitutive luck might consist in some more complex set of attitudes and values. He may have had sympathy and Nietzscheanism in equal, or nearly equal, measure. In that case, his endowment would not determine the direction in which he shapes his character, and to that extent he would not merely express his constitutive luck in shaping himself. But on this disjunct, precisely because the background against which he chooses does not determine how he chooses, he is subject to present luck. Because matters are relatively evenly balanced, what considerations happen to occur to him, or not to occur to him, may be decisive; or he may find himself simply plumping for one set of options rather than another. Where constitutive luck leaves off, present luck takes over. But the history-sensitive compatibilist appealed to the ability to shape oneself so as to ameliorate the effects of constitutive luck. If this ability is itself either merely expressive of constitutive luck, or is instead subject to present luck, or both, this appeal will fail. The compatibilist agent escapes constitutive luck only to land in present luck, and escapes present luck only to land in constitutive luck.
Agents as described by compatibilism can and perhaps often do modify their endowment very significantly. They can end up with a set of dispositions and values very different from those that were the direct joint product of their genes and their environment. In so modifying themselves, they satisfy the most demanding history-sensitive compatibilist ownership conditions. But the series of decisions whereby they supposedly take responsibility for their endowment are either expressive of that endowment, or subject to present luck, or expressive of their endowment as modified by previous actions in turn expressive of their endowment or subject to present luck. The solution to the problem of constitutive luck is therefore lots more luck. But surely no one can undo the freedom-undermining effects of luck by virtue of more luck. Iterated luck does not cease to be luck.
The problem of present luck may be smaller for compatibilists than for libertarians, but it is smaller only because of the effects of constitutive luck. If constitutive luck is an independent problem -if the right account of moral responsibility requires satisfaction of an ownership condition -then agents cannot escape from luck. Since every decision or event of intention formation which is not explained by constitutive luck will be explained by present luck, or by constitutive luck as modified by present luck, there is no solution to the problem of remote luck. If it is a problem that needs to be solved, compatibilism is in trouble.
VI. CONCLUSION
The domain of present luck may be more limited for agents as described by compatibilism than by libertarianism. But the problem is nevertheless very serious, at least for the history-sensitive compatibilist. Such compatibilists appeal to agents' ability to take responsibility for their characters to solve the problem of constitutive luck, whether in the form of normal processes of development or in the form of global manipulation. But the actions whereby agents take responsibility for the endowment either (directly or indirectly) express their constitutive luck or are subject to present luck. Present luck fills
